The quest for a solution to the thorny issue of Kashmir has spanned over six long decades, involving nearly three generations of leaders, politicians and diplomats who have tried their utmost to reach a resolution to the dispute. In the midst of all those efforts, India and Pakistan have fought three full-scale wars and were almost on the brink of a nuclear showdown in Kargil (1999). No one has been able come up with a viable solution that takes into account the national interests of India and Pakistan as well as the right of self determination of the Kashmiri people. One step forward on the peace process has most often been followed by two steps back due to the plethora of legal, ideological, political complications that have marred the issue. This is further aggravated by deep feelings of mistrust between the leaderships of both countries and constant “war mongering” that they resort to in order to appease different interest groups within their polity (Wirsing, G 1994).
However, the ground reality is that Kashmir has inflicted an enormous economic, social, political and psychological burden on the populace of both nations who live in relative insecurity and poor living conditions (Kothera, V 2007). Furthermore, with both nations acquiring nuclear weapons, Kashmir has become a potential “nuclear flashpoint” invoking the concerns of the international community to push India and Pakistan to resolve the dispute. In addition, with the post 9/11 blurring of the distinction between terrorism and indigenous freedom struggles, the Kashmir freedom movement has taken a massive blow and Pakistan has been forced to withdraw its material and moral support across the LOC under international pressure (Shushant, S 2004). It is in this context that the Pakistani establishment under the leadership of President Musharraf has engaged in a peace process to resolve the outstanding issue of Kashmir. Two approaches towards the resolution have been suggested. One is the “quick fix” solution which involves both sides moving back from their rigid stances, making acceptable compromises and reaching a mutually acceptable agreement within a short time frame. This is in contrast to the longer term approach propagated by the Indian side which involves an extended series of confidence building measures designed to build trust between the two nations so that all other issues of contention can be resolved clearing the path for the ultimate resolution of Kashmir as a result of the ensuing “peace dividend” of these long term trust building measures.
The aim of this paper is to objectively analyze the viability of the two aforementioned approaches towards the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir Dispute by first presenting a brief understanding of the dispute from the perspective of Pakistan. It will be followed by the positions of the three main parties to the issue i.e. India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people. This would set the stage for a critical analysis of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches leading to a conclusion on the way forward for Pakistan.
The significance of Kashmir to Pakistan is both ideological and geo-strategic. The ideological significance stems from its Muslim majority and can be traced back to the two nation theory based on which Jinnah made his demand for a separate Muslim homeland: that Hindus and Muslims are two separate nations who cannot live in communal harmony and so in this view it was believed that contiguous Muslim majority parts of the subcontinent be joined to form Pakistan (Ashraf, F 2002). Thus, when the Hindu maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir relinquished the control to India in October 1947, Pakistan saw it as a blatant contravention of the principles upon which partition took place and a negation of the validity of the Two Nation Theory (Malik I, 2005). Moreover, Pakistan saw it as an overt attempt by India to sabotage its existence. As Liaquat Ali Khan said, “the security of Pakistan is bound up with that of Kashmir” (Malik I, 2005). From a geo-strategic point of view, Indian occupation of Kashmir’s territory has meant economic insecurity for Pakistan since the rivers which flow into Pakistan are essential to irrigation and power supplies of Punjab; its timber resources raft down west Punjab’s river and its willow and resin are used in Pakistani industry. However, from India’s perspective, Kashmir is a vital strategic locality allowing it to border China, Afghanistan and USSR as well as putting it in a stronger military position against the “hostile” Pakistan (Malik I, 2005). Moreover, it needs Kashmir to strengthen its credentials as a vibrant, secular and pluralistic state where all communities including Muslim’s live in harmony. Thus based on these ideological and strategic reasons, subsequent events mutated an already complicated dispute.
The core of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy in International fora has been that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir be considered a disputed territory and, in accordance with UN resolutions, a plebiscite be held to determine whether the people of the state wish to join India or Pakistan. Therefore, instead of overtly demanding the state for itself, Islamabad stresses for the right of self-determination of Kashmiris with the hope that the majority of them would volunteer to join Pakistan (Malik I, 2005). Hence, Pakistan condemns India’s integration of occupied Kashmir into the Indian Union and seeks to provide “material and moral” support for the Kashmir insurgency, which it says is an indigenous freedom struggle against the “state-sponsored” terrorism conducted by India in its part of Kashmir (Ashraf F, 2002). Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir is determined by the interests of powerful groups at home, the most influential of which is the army, which needs an enemy to strengthen itself against (as justification for the high defense expenditures and modern weapon acquisitions), the politicians who have found invoking nationalism as a useful vote-winner and a means to divert attention from other problems. In addition, through media policy and “India bashing” rhetoric by politicians and religious clerics, the Pakistani public has been psyched up to such an extent that a softening of stance on the Kashmir issue elicits mass public outrage and opposition.
Another determinant of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has been poor national integration due to the tradition of undemocratic, centralized and Punjabi–dominated government leading to alienation of different ethnic groups forming Pakistan. In Sohail Inayatullah’s words: ‘Pakistan’s self-image was and continues to be defined in its otherness to India. India is the enemy that gives that unity”. Hence, Kashmir has always “stood as a symbol of collective national injury suffered at the hands of the Indians and as a spur to patriotism” (Malik I, 2005). Moreover, the extreme Jihadi element within Pakistan’s polity, which has a small but violent and vociferous following, must be appeased when considering any peace overture with India over Kashmir (Shushant, S 2004). Islamic extremists within Pakistan, although not politically strong, have been used by the establishment for conducting proxy wars against USSR in Afghanistan and most recently against India in Kashmir. As a result, they have grown in influence. These radical Islamic elements have a hawkish stance on the Kashmir issue and color it in terms of Islam – as a struggle waged by Muslims against non-Muslims i.e. a Jihad (Malik I, 2005).
In contrast to this, traditional policy of India towards Kashmir has been to recognize the entire state as an integral part of India (the atoot-ang), accusing Pakistan of occupying its rightful territory (Malim, I 2004). But recently, New Delhi’s policy initiative towards Kashmir calls for, first and foremost, a move towards the isolation of forces perpetrating violence. Secondly, a readiness to initiate unconditional negotiations with the Kashmiri people, including separatists and thirdly, the commitment to hold free and fair elections for the state’s legislative assembly. These are moves aimed towards reducing the feeling of alienation and suppression felt by the Kashmiri people which forced them to take up arms in an uprising against the Indian occupying forces in the late 1980’s. However, subsequent elections which took place saw a meager voter turnout of 10-12% according to Indian reports with Kashmir’s people strongly rejecting their validity with slogans like: “no election, no selection, we want freedom” (Ashraf, F 2002).
The third and most important party to the dispute is the Kashmiri people whose right to self determination, although recognized in the United Nations, has never been given to them. Furthermore, it should include the rights of not only the Muslims who have a two-thirds majority in the region but also the Hindu Pandits of Jammu and the Buddhists of Ladakh (Wirsing G, 1994). Thus, any viable solution would have to include as a sine qua non the full support of the Kashmiri people. It must be realized that the deployment of 700,000 armed forces personnel by India and the ensuing violations of human rights law has further alienated the Kashmiri’s. Moreover, the cross border involvement of non-Kashmiri militants instigating violence in the region has also angered the Kashmiri’s towards Pakistan who see themselves suffering the most in the cross fire between the two nations (Haqqani, H 2003). Not only have they paid a heavy price in terms of human lives lost but it has also negatively affected their livelihoods which depended on tourism.
Based on the above stances of the two nations and the aspirations of the Kashmiri people, what are Pakistan’s realistic options towards the resolution of the Kashmir dispute? Pakistan must realize that gaining Kashmir through violence is a forgone option based on the fact that it has unsuccessfully fought “three and a half” wars and mounted a futile covert proxy campaign for 14 years (Sareen S 2004). Given the rising international concern against nuclear war and terrorism, both these options are now out of consideration. Furthermore, with most of Pakistan’s security forces busy fighting a Taliban styled insurgency in its north-western region, Pakistan is facing a strategic crisis. It needs to settle its disputes with India so that it can focus on its internal crisis which is threatening the very existence of the state (Koithra V, 2007). The very Jihadi militants that Pakistan utilized in its proxy wars against India and USSR are now threatening its stability. Moreover, attempts by Pakistan to crack down against the Jihadi elements have resulted in a violent reaction against the state, which even resulted in suicide attacks against high profile leaders as well as rising militancy and sectarian violence. Thus, there is a realization which is summed up by President Musharraf saying that the internal threats to Pakistan are far more serious than the external threat (Sareen S, 2004). Another important change in the current scenario is the fact that Pakistani establishment, especially the army, has started understanding that its own corporate interests are being undermined. According to Dr. Akmal Hussein, a renowned Pakistani economist, the generals have understood that unless the economy can be put on a high growth path, they will simply be unable to find the resources to keep the military machine in fighting state and might soon have no state left to protect (Sareen S. 2004)
It is in this context that President Musharraf put forward the four-part process to defuse the crisis in Kashmir to the Aspen Strategy group in 2002. According to the four part process, a) India and Pakistan must resume an official dialogue; b) both must accept the premise that Kashmir is central to the dispute; c) eliminate from the discussions what each side find unacceptable; and d) The fourth step, which he described as the most difficult step, is of the 10-12 solutions proposed by people around the world, take one which is a win-win situation for India, Pakistan and for the people of Kashmir (Ashraf F, 2002). This forms the basis of the quick fix approach towards the Kashmir dispute. Musharaff’s formula envisages softer borders in Kashmir with freedom of movement for the Kashmiris; autonomy or "self-governance" within each region of Kashmir; staggered demilitarization of all regions; and finally, a "joint supervisory mechanism," with representatives from India, Pakistan and all parts of Kashmir, to oversee the plan's implementation (Bidwai, P 2007).
India on the other hand has been proposing a more long term approach to solving the Kashmir dispute. This involves a composite dialogue consisting of a series of Confidence Building Measures (CBM’s) aimed at developing feelings of trust and friendship between the two nations so that disputes damaging relations between the two countries can be gradually addressed one at a time generating the momentum for the ultimate resolution of Kashmir. This would enable the leaders to take bold initiatives and less rigid stances due to public backing for a solution. This is true even for issues which have been agreed upon in principle; like the reopening of consulates in Karachi and Bombay. Proponents of the long-term approach advocate friendly exchanges, increased people to people contact and suggestions to promote trade and commercial links. Furthermore they suggest gradual end of hostilities in Kashmir, lowering of troop levels and advanced notification of military exercises, ballistic missiles testing and exchange of list of nuclear installations of both countries. Thus, according to this proposal, the baggage of history, of mistrust, wars, accusations, counter accusations and deadlocks warrants that a more protracted and comprehensive approach should be adopted to right the wrongs of the past sixty years.
Proponents of the quick fix approach, mostly in Pakistan, point to the fact that sixty years have already been a long enough time for the long term approach. However, for one reason or another, Kashmir has still remained unresolved. This has resulted in huge costs for the peoples of the region in terms of massive amounts being allotted to defense budgets, military buildups and high cost wars being fought in desolate and useless regions like Siachin. Moreover, the resulting instability and atmosphere of antagonism hurts the economic growth of both nations in general and Pakistan in particular. The sixty year long dispute is compared to an open wound from which blood symbolized by human and economic loss is gushing out. Rather than prolonging the agony of the subcontinent, leading to massive instability and violence, the two parties are asked to reach a quick fix solution that would bandage this gaping wound and make the subcontinent a safer and stable region opening the prospects for healthy cooperation along the economic, social and cultural fronts. Moreover, it is argued that once this wound of Kashmir is closed down, all other smaller blemishes and niggles like the water sharing problems, the issue of Siachin and other smaller problems would get solved almost simultaneously. Moreover, from the Pakistani perspective the long term approach is just a non serious attempt by India to “wear down” the Kashmir issue granting it enough time to quell the indigenous Kashmir resistance by military force or political appeasement (Kux, D 2000). Additionally, it is perceived that if all other outstanding issues besides Kashmir are resolved, then India would not have the incentive or the necessity to solve Kashmir in which it already has a distinctly strong military position.
The longer term approach draws its strength from the argument that a quick fix can never be expected to be permanent considering that it requires radical backtracks from positions without distinctive changes in the mindsets of the majority of the interest groups involved. Thus, such measures are bound to face opposition from different segments of society in both countries who have been programmed through media and public discourse towards particular hard-line positions over the issue. As a result, there is a greater chance that in face of violent opposition - from religious groups, opposition parties and segments of military who would want to reverse any quick fix solution which is against their interests – the solutions won’t last. Therefore, rather than just bandaging up the wound without addressing the complicated reasons of why the injury took place would only make the region prone to another such accident re-opening the old wound. Thus the ailments of mistrust and rigid positions fueled by hard-line viewpoints can only be cured if the patient is given the medicine of hope and trust for an extended period of time.
The merits of both the quick fix and long term solutions make sense. Objectively analyzing both approaches makes one reach the conclusion that the true approach lies somewhere in the middle whereby the “quick-fix” vigor and urgency of finding out-of-the-box solutions can be used on a long term basis alongside an extended and genuine series of CBM’s. The current scenario is ripe for both India and Pakistan to work towards resolving the issue. The reduction in violence in J&K has also contributed to the recent peace overtures over the Kashmir issue. Recent years have seen the lowest level of violence for a decade, and the downward trend has been steady. Pakistan has realized that it cannot use killings to create negotiating leverage For Pakistan, the need to seek political and security comfort on its eastern front, the army’s realization of the failure of its “fight and talk” strategy and the international pressure for diffusing any future possibility of a nuclear war, have meant that there has been a growing shift towards getting this issue out of the way (Koithara V, 2007). Any future movement on Kashmir would require Pakistan to de-emphasize religion as well as move away from its purblind “anti-Indian” strategy. This would require resorting to the long term approach of creating friendly perception of each country through the media, as well as allowing academia and intelligentsia of both countries and Kashmir to come together and talk on ways to creatively solve Kashmir. It would increase the available options for both countries which can be discussed extensively in formal as well as back door diplomacy channels. The broad principles along which both countries would negotiate must be agreed upon. There should be a greater focus on future rather than obsession with the past as has been the case in previous diplomatic interactions. The Irish model (Ashraf, F 2002) coupled with President Musharafs’ proposals seem viable points to start out whereby greater autonomy and self-governance can be granted to the regions of Jammu and Kashmir under a tripartite supervisory framework involving Pakistan, India and UN. Followed by the phased withdrawal of troops, and the induction of an indigenous Kashmiri police force, this would ideally lead to the formation of political parties which would be allowed to operate in both parts and participate in the resulting periodic democratic elections. The time is ripe to sow the seeds of peace in the subcontinent. The leaders of both countries should seize this opportunity to give the people of the region hope for a better tomorrow.
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